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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,
a corpora tion,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
THE ST. PAUL INSURANCE \ Case No.
COMPANIES,
,· 10765
Defendant and Appellant,
and
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE AND TRUST COMP ANY, Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
AND TRUST COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This action seeks declaratory relief interpreting the
policy of fidelity insurance of the defendant-appellant,
1

St. Paul Insurance Companies, declaring whether or
not said insurance company is excused from its liabilitv
under said policy by reason of the existence of a titie
insurance policy issued by defendant-respondent, First
American Title Insurance and Trust Company.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court declared that appellant's policy of
insurance covered the fidelity loss described in the pleadings, and that appellant was not excused from liability
by reason of the existence of a title insurance policy, and
thereby entered summary judgment in favor of the
insured, and dismissed the cause as to the title insurance
company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-respondent, First American Title
Insurance & Trust Company, submits that the judg·
ment of the trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-respondent will hereinafter be referred
to as Prudential. Defendant-appellant will hereinafter
be referred to as St. Paul, and defendant-respondent
will hereinafter be referred to as First American.
Without intending to be picayune, St. Paul's dis·
organized statement of facts can only lead to confusion.
2

The facts herein are simple and without dispute, leaving
only an issue of law, which the trial court properly
resolved by summary judgment. The facts in a nutshell
are:
( 1) One Delmar D. Rowley, a long standing

trusted loan officer of Prudential, embezzled substantial
sums of money from Prudential (R. 2, 5).
(2) Rowley was charged, tried and convicted of
four counts of "misapplication of funds by savings and
loan association officer" including the misapplication
of the funds entitled "The William Duane Parker Account" (R. 40-44).
(3) At the time of said embezzlements and mis-

applications, St. Paul had issued its blanket bond indenmifying Prudential against loss by reason of any
dishonest or fraudulent act of any of Prudential's
employees (R. 1, 5), the precise wording of the policy
being:
INSURING
CLAUSE A:

"The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the Insured:
(a) To any amount not exceeding

$1,000,000.00 from and against-

Fidelity of
Employees

1. Any loss by reason of any dishon-

est, fraudulent or criminal act of any
Employee, as heretofore defined, or
of any director or trustee of the Insured while perfarming acts coming
within the scope of the usual duties
of an Employee, including loss of
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property by reason of any such act
of any such Employee, and also including the dishonest issue of stock
share or investment certificates h)'.
any such Employee, whether acting
alone or in collusion with others."
(P. Ex. 1).
( 4) Rowley embezzled the "Parker" account money
from Prudential by pocketing the loan from Prudential
to Parker when, in fact, his duty, obligation and trust
was to pay the major portion of said loan to First
Federal Savings & Loan Association, which held a prior
first mortgage lien against the Parker property (R.
1, 2, 5).
( 5) After Rowley's embezzlement and misappli·
cation of Prudential's money, but prior to the discovery
of his criminal act, a policy of title insurance was issued
by First American to Prudential insuring against the
invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of Prudential's
mortgage upon the Parker property (R. 3, 25). The
preliminary title report issued prior to the completion
of the Prudential loan showed the existence of, and
excepted from the forthcoming policy, the First Federal
Savings & Loan Association mortgage. The policy
was issued, apparently in error, after Rowley's em·
bezzlement, making no reference to the First Federal
mortgage ( R. 3, 33-35) . The policy of title insurance
contained the following exclusions from the coverage
of the policy:

4

"3. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE
COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY

This policy does not insure against loss
or damage by reason of the following:

*

*

*

*

( d) Defects, lie.ns, encumbrances, adverse claims against the title as insured or
other matters (I) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claiming loss of damage; or ( 2) known to the
Insured Claimant at the date such Insured Claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy and not known
to the Company or not shown by the public records; or ( 3) resulting in no loss to
the insured Claimant; or ( 4) attaching or
created subsequent to the date hereof."
( 6) The St. Paul fidelity bond contains a clause
which provides:

Other
Insurance

"If the Insured holds other valid or
collectible indemnity against any loss,
covered hereunder, the Underwriter
shall be liable hereunder only for such
amount of such loss as is excess of
the amount of such other indemnity,
not exceeding the amount of coverage hereunder." (P. Ex. I).

The exclusionary clause is the very heart of the matter
before this court.
(7) Prudential sought declaratory relief to determine if the exclusionary clause meant that St. Paul
was not responsible because of the issuance of First
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American's title policy. St. Paul, in its pleadings,
memorandums, arguments, offers of proof and briefs
on appeal asserts that its policy does not cover Rowley's
embezzlement because of this clause and the existe~ce
of the First American title policy. Anything else
presented by St. Paul does not meet this issue, but
clouds it.
( 8) The trial court specifically found and declared
that the title insurance policy did not constitute "other
valid or collectible indemnity against any loss covered
hereunder" (that is by the St. Paul fidelity bond).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECLARATORY DETERMINATION
THAT THE TITLE POLICY DOES NOT CON·
STITUTE AN EXCLUSION FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE FIDELITY POLICY IS
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.

A determination of the meaning of St. Paul's
fidelity policy does not really require great mental ·
gymnastics or a resort to detailed legal precedent. St.
Paul, for a premium, insured Prudential up to one
million dollars with respect to dishonest, fraudulent and
criminal acts of its employees, burglary and robbery,
loss of customer's property, fraud, counterfeiting,
forgery and unexplained disappearance of other
property. The bond is a standard building and loan
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association protection from losses resulting from dishonesty and chicanery. The bond in no way purports
to cover such things as validity of title to property. As
is standard in insurance contracts, whereby insurance
companies seek to prevent the insured from recovering
twice for the same loss, the fidelity bond provides that
if Prudential has more than one fidelity policy, then the
other fidelity policies must first respond. It cannot
reasonably be claimed that the statement:
"If the Insured holds other valid or collectible
indemnity against any loss, covered hereunder,
the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder only
for such amount of such loss as is excess of the
amount of such other indemnity, not exceeding
the amount of coverage hereunder." (P. Ex. 1).
was meant to insulate St. Paul from liability if Prudential also held title insurance, or for that matter, fire
insurance, earthquake insurance, automobile insurance,
or public liability insurance.

"Insurance policies usually provide against the
existence or procuring of other or additional insurance upon the property insured without the
consent of the insurer. Such a provision is designed to check the fraud or carelessness resulting from over-insurance." 29A Am. Jur. 149,
Insurance, §954.
It is uniformly held that "other" insurance, as that
term is used in exclusionary clauses of insurance policies,
exists only where more than one policy of insurance
coYers the same interest, in the same property against
the same risk for the same person. There is "other"
insurance only where the insured undertakes to msure
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the same thing twice over against the same perils.
29A Am. J ur. 153, Insurance, § 961. See Blue

Anchor Overall Co., Inc., v. Pennsylvania Lumber.
men's Mutual Ins. Co. (1956), 385 Pa. 394, 123
A. 2d 413, 59 ALR 2d 546, wherein the defendant
fire insurance policy covered fire loss and included
coverage for loss from leakage from fire protection
equipment and said policy contained a clause that the
loss should be apportioned in the event the insured
carried "other insurance whether concurrent or not."
Other fire insurance policies carried by the insured
contained no express coverage for leakage, and the court
held that "other insurance" would exist only where two
nr more policies covered the same interest, subject matter and risk.

i

1

The provisions of insurance contracts are to be
construed in the sense in which they are ordinarily used,
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Winget, 34 ALR
2d 250, 197 F.2d 97, and unambiguous terms of an in·
surance policy are to be taken in their plain, ordinary
and popular sense. Abraham v. Insurance Company of
North America, 29 ALR 2d 783, 117 Vt. 75, 84 A.2<l
670. If there is ambiguity in the language of an insur· :
ance policy, it shall be resolved in favor of the insured.
Kavanagh v. The Maccabees, 242 Pac. 403, 66 Utah
307; Colovos v. Home Life Insurance Co. of New York,
28 P.2d 607, 83 Utah 401.
1

St. Paul suggests that several obscure meanings
were intended by the words, "If the insured holds other
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valid or collectible indemnity against any loss covered
hereunder, the underwriter shall be liable hereunder
only for such amount of such loss as is excess of the
amount of such other indemnity.", to wit:
(I) That St. Paul's liability is excluded because

the loss is within the more specific coverage of the title
policy;

(2) That St. Paul's coverage is excess only, and
the title policy is a "no liability" coverage, and that,
in this event, the no liability coverage must pay.
It is most difficult, if not impossible, to read either
of these meanings into the St. Paul exclusionary clause,
and to do so would do violence to the construction
standards, requiring the contract to be construed in its
plain, ordinary meaning. In any event, we are faced
with the following fallacies in St. Paul's reasoning:
(I) With respect to the claimed doctrine of "spe-

cific and general insurance'', the cases all deal with a
general insurer with an express provision in its policy
that if either there is other more "specific" insurance
or other insurance covering the same risk, that th~
general insurer will be considered only an excess insurer.
See United States Guarantee Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Wisc. S. Ct.)', 12 N.W.2d 59, 150
ALR 632. See also Annotation 150 ALR 636. The
St. Paul policy does not expressly ref er to other more
''specific" insurance, but, of course, it does refer to
other insurance covering the same risk (that is, "other
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insurance against any loss covered hereunder") which
brings us right back to the dilemma of St. Paul's
position. The risks are not the same. In the case claimed
by St. Paul in support of the claimed doctrine of general '
and specific clauses, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
Co. v. Cochran Oil, Mill & Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App.
288, 105 S. E. 856, both policies therein covered personal
injuries. The general policy provided that it would be
considered excess coverage if another policy covering
personal injuries from boiler explosions existed. The
boiler policy provided that it would be considered excess
coverage if other insurance existed covering the same
risk. Not only were the two policies expressly involved •
with the same risk, but the general policy expressly ,
referred to more specific insurance covering the same :
risk, and in addition, the specific policy contained an
excess clause, thereby confronting the court with a true
apportionment problem-a far cry from the issue here ..

(2) The second claimed interpretation of the St.
Paul exclusionary clause, to wit: That there is a doctrine that between "no liability" policies and "excess"
policies, the no liability policy must pay, is also not
applicable. The claimed doctrine deals with a situation 1
where two policies covering the same risk both contain
clauses to avoid double insurance recovery, one of which
is the excess clause (which we are faced with here l
and the other is: "If there is other insurance covering
the same risk, there shall be no liability on this policy." '
There is no such latter clause in the title policy in this
suit. The title policy m no way attempts to guard
10

against double title insurance, nor does it seek to guard
against other fidelity insurance. Obviously, the title
policy covers a different risk and the classic concern of
double insurance recoveries does not exist. Again, the
claimed doctrine deals with true apportionment between
liability insurers covering the same risk. See annotation
46 ALR 2d 1163, beginning at page 1165.
In summation, to prevent double recoveries, insurance contracts often contain the following clauses:
( 1 ) If there is more than one policy covering the
same risk, the insurers shall hear the loss prorata or
proportionately (no such clause here). See annotation
21 ALR 2d 611.
(2) If there is more than one policy covering the
same risk, the policy more specifically co~ering the same
risk shall bear the loss (not the situation here) . See
annotation 150 ALR 636
( 3) If there is more than one policy covering the
same risk, there shall be no liability with respect to the
particular policy (no such provision in either policy
herein). See annotation 46 ALR 2d 1163.

(4) If there is more than one policy covering the
same risk, the particular policy shall be considered
e.rcess insurance (not the situation herein). 29A Am .
.Tur., Insurance, p. 794, §1715; annotation 46 ALR
2d 1165; annotation 76 ALR 2d 502.
Of course, a variety of judicial complications can
arise with respect to apportioning liability when various
combinations of the above escape clauses are presented.
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29A Am. Jur., Insurance, p. 795, §1716. But we a~
here faced with a fidelity policy with an excess claust
a title policy covering a different risk with no clam1
to prevent doubling up of title recoveries, and insteao
clear language that the policy does not insure against
an adverse claim against the title created by the insureo
itself. This is not an apportionment problem.
POINT II.
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECLARATORY JUDG·
l\1IENT IS PREJVIATURE OR PROCEDURAL·
LY FAULTY BECAUSE:
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT
PLAINTIFF HAS SUSTAINED A LOSS;
B. MATERIAL ISSUES OFF ACT EXIST;
AND
C. THE COURT FAILED TO DETER
MINE A SUPPOSED ISSUE OF ULTI·
MATE LIABILITY BETWEEN THE IN·
SURERS WHICH WOULD OCCUR BY
REASON OF AN ALLEGED RIGHT OF
SUBROGATION,
ARE SPECIOUS AND WITHOUT MERIT.
St. Paul's Points I, V, VI, and VII valiantly seek
to prolong the final judgment herein by claims of pro·
cedural error. St. Paul first claims that the judgment
is faulty because there is no evidence that Prudential
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sustained a loss. It will be recalled that the complaint
seeking declaratory relief as to the construction of St.
Paul's fidelity policy alleges that Rowley embezzled
the money and that St. Paul's policy covers the embezzlement, unless the exclusionary clause discussed
above constitutes a valid escape hatch. This is all admitted by St. Paul's answer, and St. Paul also prays
that the court declare it to have no liability by reason
of the exclusionary clause (R. 5, 6). The issue of the
amount or the extent of Prudential's loss is not before
this court. St. Paul will have its day in court to question, if need be, the amount of the loss. The only thing
to be resolved by this proceeding is whether or not St.
Paul's policy covers the fidelity loss in question - a
completely proper procedure under our declaratory
judgment statute, 78-31-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
giving the court the "power to declare rights, status and
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed".
Secondly, St. Paul claims that the trial court acted
hastily because other necessary facts should be determined such as whether or not Prudential relied upon
the title policy, whether or not Rowley was acting
within the scope of his employment in pocketing Prudential's money, etc. This is most immaterial to the
prayer for declaratory relief, to wit: Does the escape
clause let St. Paul out, in view of the title policy?
Thirdly, St. Paul urges that the trial court should
have resolved all matters once and for all including even
the assumed situation whereby St. Paul pays off Pru-
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dential on its fidelity claim and then allegedly thereby
stands in some position of subrogation against the titie
company. None of these issues were before the District
Court and any attempt by the District Court to litigate
them prior to the happening of the events imagined
would be improper. None of the parties sought such
relief, and St. Paul's assertions in this regard cloud
the real issue and seek to prolong the ultimate agony
of the trial court's decision that the clause in St. Paul's
policy seeking to mitgate against double insurance cover·
ing the same risk has no application herein.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the district court should be affirmed. Appellant's policy
clearly covers plaintiff-respondent's loss from embezzle·
ment by its loan officer, and no other insurance existed
enabling appellant to invoke the exclusionary clause
in its policy. The issues were precisely and thoroughly
presented to the trial court and the declaratory judg·
ment rendered thereby is in accord with established
law.
Respectfully submitted,

DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEIN
and DELBERT M. DRAPER, JR.
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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